Details
The following are excerpts of White House Presidential recordings of four meetings between President Kennedy and his highest level Vietnam advisors in late August of 1963.
These meetings are the first ones to take place after Cable 243, described by some historians as the “single most controversial cable of the Vietnam War, ” was drafted on Saturday August 24, 1963 when President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and CIA Director John McCone were all out of town. The telegram set a course for the eventual coup in Vietnam on November 1, 1963 leading to the fall of President Diem and his death on November 2, 1963.
After the cable was sent and during the course of four days of meetings, President Kennedy met with his advisors to discuss the evolving situation in Vietnam and what steps should be taken. There was considerable disagreement between the State Department advisors, who had drafted Cable 243 and the President’s military and intelligence advisors on whether the coup was advisable and what support it would have in Vietnam with the Vietnamese military.
Transcript
Vietnam Excerpt Compilation file:
Clip 1: 8/26/63
107 Reel 1 at 59:16
8/26/63 CD at 6:53
Excerpt CD at :04
President Kennedy: Diem and his brother with all of their defects have (just reached) in the situation there which permit the - Harkins, based on his report to us a week ago, to feel that this thing is really moving to a positive, successful conclusion. So when we move to eliminate a government, we want to be sure we’re not doing it just because the New York Times is excited about it.
Clip 2: 8/27/63
107 Reel 3 at 18:56
8/27/63 CD at 56:26
Excerpt CD at :35
President Kennedy: What about - in the wire that went Saturday, what’s the degree of- My impression was that based on the wire that went out Saturday, asked General Harkins and Ambassador Lodge recommending a course of action unless they disagreed. (General Taylor then states that Harkins concurred). That’s right, so I think we ought to find out whether Harkins doesn’t agree with this - then I think we ought to get off this pretty quick.
Clip 3: 8/27/63
107 Reel 3 at 20:36
8/27/63 CD at 58:00
Excerpt CD at 1:07
President Kennedy: Let’s get out a cable - shall we now - and - in which we would ask them, based on what they know as of now, what they feel their prospects are for success and do they recommend continuing it or do they recommend now waiting on the grounds as suggested by the Ambassador? We might wait and see whether the situation begins to disintegrate and then the United States would use its maximum influence and how far we’ve gone and so on and so forth. And if we’ve decided not to, whether what action should be taken to insure the safety of those - All these questions seem to me ought to go right down to the people involved.
Clip 4: 8/27/63
107 Reel 3 at 24:01
8/27/63 CD at 1:01:17
Excerpt CD at 1:58
President Kennedy: Ah, do we cut our losses in such a way where we don’t endanger those who’ve we’ve been in contact.
McGeorge Bundy: Do we want to ask the question - I’m not sure that we do, I think it’s a hard one to put to a new Ambassador. If I understand Ambassador Nolting correctly, one of the things that he would be tempted to do or to recommend to people on the scene is one more try at Diem as to the political liquidation of his brother and sister-in-law, is that right? You would like to try that once more?
Frederick Nolting: I think I would put it this way, the political liquidation of his sister-in-law and the - putting the curbs on his brother. (break)
President Kennedy: The response that we’ve gotten on the coup at this point does not give assurances that it’s going to be successful based on it…or maybe that’s impossible to get those assurances. Wasn’t that - I would certainly think we would indicate, based on what Ambassador Nolting says, that what they’re talking about in the way of [Vietnamese] Generals now, isn’t good enough.
Clip 5: 8/28/63
107 Reel 3 at 1:07:00
8/28/63 CD at 25:45
Excerpt CD at 3:19
President Kennedy: I don’t think we ought to take the view here that this has gone beyond our control ‘cause I think that would be the worst reason to do it.
McGeorge Bundy: I have to (say to) ask whether you and Harkins in light of developing situations presently favor operation as currently planned by Generals and their answer is just as simple as this - ‘on the basis of what we now know, both General Harkins and I favor operation’.
President Kennedy: I think we ought not - I don’t know where it’s going but I mean, I don’t think these things are ever gone until they happen, and I think if we decided that it wasn’t in the cards then I think we could unload it because the Generals don’t (worry about this much public trust). Well I don’t think we ought to just do it because we feel we have to now do it. I think we want to make it our best (sitting) judgment (is to date) because I don’t think we do have to do it. At least I’d be prepared to take up the argument with lawyers, well let’s not do it. So I think we ought to try to make it without feeling that it’s forced on us.
Clip 6: 8/28/63
108 Reel 1 at 21:30
8/28/63 CD at 50:28
Excerpt CD at 4:18
I don’t think we ought to let the coup…maybe they know about it, maybe the Generals are going to have to run out of the country, maybe we’re going to have to help them get out. But still it’s not a good enough reason to go ahead if we don’t think the prospects are good enough. I don’t think we’re in that deep. I am not sure the Generals are - they’ve been probably bellyaching for months. So I don’t know whether their - how many of them are really up to here. I don’t see any reason to go ahead unless we think we have a good chance of success.